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A David Little Retrospective
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I

n addition to David Little’s significant contributions to the literature on
peace and human rights, at several junctures in his distinguished academic
and professional career he engaged topics central to Buddhist ethics. In
this chapter I propose to superimpose a trajectory on this engagement that
begins with his chapter on Theravada ethics in Comparative Religious Ethics:
A New Method, which he co-authored with Sumner B. Twiss;1 his debate
with Frank E. Reynolds in Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: A Study in Buddhist
Social Ethics;2 and his several publications on Buddhism, nationalism, and
ethnicity in Sri Lanka.3 I shall argue that Little’s account works best when
contextualized in terms of Sri Lanka, and is least successful in Comparative
Religious Ethics: A New Method. At each of the three junctures in this
trajectory, Weberian-like perspectives loom large: in broad terms they
are the interdependence between belief and behavior; and a typological
construction of religious systems of thought and action.
I have chosen these three junctures in Little’s work that engage
Buddhist ethics, in part because they mark three moments in my personal
and academic relationship with him beginning with my review of Comparative
Religious Ethics in Religious Studies Review;4 the Harvard-Berkeley-Chicago
conferences in comparative religious ethics in which we participated;5
and the conferences that we co-led at the Center for the Study of World
Religions at Harvard Divinity School on Religion and Nationalism in 2005,
and Visions of Peace and Reconciliation in 2007.6
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Comparative Religious Ethics: A New Method
The three case studies that Little and Twiss take up in the Application
section of Comparative Religious Ethics: A New Method—Religion and Morality
of the Navajo, the book of Matthew, and Theravada Buddhism—first
address the issue of the relationship between moral and religious action
guides, and then examine the structure of the practical reasoning or the way
in which the tradition justifies action. In the case of Theravada Buddhism
they argue that “properly understood, all action-guides have as their object
nirvanic attainment.”7 Given the preeminence of the basic religious claim,
that is, Nibbana/Nirvana as sacred authority, the Theravada practical
system must necessarily be a thoroughgoing religious system; and, that as
a religious system it ultimately transcends morality follows from the fact
that Nibbana obviates the concepts of self and other. All prescribed and
proscribed acts are ultimately defined in reference to self-conquest.8 Even
though Little and Twiss find that Theravada Buddhism encourages the
cultivation of attitudes and acts that reflect a regard for the material welfare
of others and that a central role is assigned to the virtues of sympathy and
generosity, they contend that
there can be no doubt that the content of the action-guides, when
systematically analyzed, is, in the last analysis, religious in character.
. . . All moral attitudes and acts are consistently modified by a belief in
a sacred authority (nirvana) that not only drastically subordinates the
material welfare of others in favor of their spiritual enlightenment,
but also, and even more importantly, disallows the ultimate reality
of selves and others.9

The validational patterns—the character of an act, rules, principles of
validation, and considerations to persuade—of Theravada practical
teaching leads to a similar conclusion. The first, a qualified intrapersonal
teleology, aims at the realization of one’s highest happiness, that is, Nibbana,
without directly benefiting others; the second, a qualified extrapersonal
teleology, aims at the realization of Nibbana for oneself and for all sentient
beings; and the third, a pattern of unqualified intrapersonal teleology,
aims at maximizing one’s happiness according to the calculus of karmic
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consequences. The last pattern is seen as secondary or subsidiary, while
the first two contain the premise of a fundamental belief in the ultimate
unreality of human persons.
The key concept in the content and structure of Theravada practical
teaching is the notion of dhamma/dharma, ontologically understood
as reducing reality, including human existence, to basic elements or
constituents and, hence, the concept of dhamma becomes another way
of perceiving the “unreality of the concept ‘self,’ by reducing all putative
selves to their more basic elementary constituents.”10 Thus, while there is
a moral dimension to the Theravada action guide (value concepts, actionguiding concepts, dispositional concepts), it is provisional and subsidiary,
qualified by a belief in a sacred authority, Nibbana, according to which the
concept of the self and the other is dissolved.
In addition to the Nibbanic and the Dhammic deconstruction of
reality into elements, much is made of the Theravada concept of not-self
(anatta), especially in regard to Little and Twiss’s assessment of the tradition
as a thoroughgoing religious system in which other-regarding concerns are
subsidiary and provisional. Morality is by definition interrelational, that
is, it involves relations among persons; and one of the special conditions
of the legitimacy of a moral action guide is that it is other-regarding.11
Logically, for a religious tradition which has as one of its cardinal teachings
the concept of not-self and in which the character of all prescribed and
proscribed acts is ultimately deemed in reference to “self-conquest,” a moral
action guide, as defined in Comparative Religious Ethics, will have a secondary
place at best. Furthermore, at the vindication level of the structure of the
practical teachings of the Theravada, the “radical depersonalization of
humanity” entailed by the analysis of the self into dhammic components
re-enforces Little and Twiss’s claim: “In the ultimate sense…discussion
of morality is inappropriate because the notion of morality presupposes
persons, or at least intentions normally associated with persons, and these
are not found in Nirvana.”12
In brief, Little and Twiss’s description of religion and morality
in Theravada Buddhism utilizes a typological strategy (a transpersonal
teleological action guide) in which the major justificatory terms—Nibbana,
not-self, and reality/human existence as constituted by evanescent dhammic
particulars—at the very least, problematize an ethic of other-regard.
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It is perhaps an understatement to say that Comparative Religious Ethics
raised a storm of controversy, especially among historians of religion who
argued that the formal model of appellate reasoning which informed the
interpretation of Theravada ethics sacrificed the complexity and historical
realities of the Theravada tradition to a logical reductionism determined
primarily by Nibbana as the overriding “sacred authority.” Little recalls a
contentious incident that took place at the Harvard comparative religious
ethics discussions when the late Wilfred Cantwell Smith, then director
of the Center of the Study of World Religions, “delivered a furious
denunciation of the approach [Twiss] and I took . . . [and argued] that
the book represented an enormous setback in the comparative study of
religious ethics, bringing to it unwelcome Western analytical techniques
whose only effect is to distort severely the materials under consideration.”13
Little himself has reevaluated the Little/Twiss approach to Comparative
Religious Ethics and, “had I [to] do it over again,” he observes, I “would
approach the subject quite differently.”14
Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation:
A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics
The lively debate sparked by Comparative Religious Ethics in the formative
days of the development of the field of comparative religious ethics, was a
measure of its significance, especially around issues of theory and history.
At the time, Buddhologists cum historians of religion, especially Frank E.
Reynolds, took aim at two major monographs in the field of comparative
religious ethics published in 1978: Comparative Religious Ethics: A New
Method and Ronald M. Green’s Religious Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis
of Religious.15 Reynolds opined that when historians of religion take up the
task of comparative religious ethics they place the study of ethics of a
religious tradition within the context of a holistic understanding of that
tradition including a diversity of texts and ritual practices, and that they
“do not become so enmeshed in abstract theoretical discussions that they
are distracted from their empirical research.”16
In his essay in the conference volume, Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: A
Study of Buddhist Social Ethics, Reynolds proposes a multivalent interpretation
of dhamma that challenges Nibbana as the foundational “sacred authority”
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for religion and morality in Theravada Buddhism. Furthermore, Reynolds
critiques Little’s singular interpretation of the concept of dhamma as the
constitutive elements of reality and human existence that, in conjunction
with the concept of not-self, undermine an ethic of other-regard. Reynolds
contends that dhamma, broadly conceived, is a complex and dynamic reality
and, as such, stands as the Theravadin religio-ethical center of gravity and
normative truth that establishes guidelines for all forms of action. Dhammic
norms do, indeed, have soteriological significance in that they express and
cultivate non-attachment, however, at the same time adherence to dhammic
norms is conducive to the production of goods such as wealth and the
general well-being of individuals and communities. Although dhammic
norms are the basis of the monastic code of discipline (vinaya), they are
equally the foundation of lay ethics. Adherence to dhammic norms by rulers
is of particular importance for the well-being of the entire community.
Righteous kings (dhammraja) ensure peace, prosperity, and justice in their
realms by embodying a set of ten virtues, the dasarajadharma—generosity,
high moral character, self-sacrifice, integrity, gentleness, non-indulgence,
non-anger, non-oppression, tolerance—and adherence to the dhamma is
understood in this instance as a universal moral law. “In addition to the
dhammic activities of kings,” observes Reynolds, “the dhammic actions
of other laymen and laywomen are recognized as contributing to social
harmony, to a supportive natural environment, and to the economic
prosperity that is associated with a properly ordered natural and social
world.”17
Little offers three responses to Reynolds. First, Little defends
his typological construction of Theravada religion and morality as
fundamentally teleological, dominated by the concept of Nibbana.
Although Little admits that Reynold’s shift from Nibbana to the category
of dhamma as the over-arching concept informing Theravada religion and
morality “suggests a need for some modification and further elaboration
and clarification of the Little-Twiss interpretation,”18 he insists that it
does not contradict that interpretation. Although strictly speaking I would
agree, Little’s characterization of Theravada as a system “according to
which dhammic activity, if properly performed leads ultimately to the
highest goal of Nibbana and its achievement signifies the condition of
complete non-attachment” does not take sufficient account of Reynolds’s
expansive, multiplex interpretation of dhamma. Reynolds intends his shift
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from Nibbana to dhamma as Theravada’s sacred authority to be not merely
an “extension” of the concept of “sacred authority,” as Little opines, but
as a substantive “revision.”19
Second, Little challenges historians of religion like Reynolds to translate
their tradition-embedded description into ethical categories amenable to
cross-cultural comparison such as the structure of practical justification
advocated in Comparative Religious Ethics: A New Method. He proposes that
an “ethical translation” of historians’ “data” into “conventional categories
for the study of practical reasoning,” makes Theravada reflections on issues
such as wealth and poverty more adaptive to cross-cultural comparison and
difference; for example, contrasting understandings of distributive justice,
or contrasts between the Theravadin and Puritan economic ethic.20 Little’s
point is perennially relevant, and both provocative and problematic when
it comes to comparative work as Jeffrey Stout brilliantly pointed out in his
critical review of Comparative Religious Ethics.21
Third, Little agrees with Reynolds’s challenge to ethicists to broaden
their scope of investigation to include non-normative texts and doctrines,
but, in his consistently gentlemanly manner, he contends that Reynolds’s
“holism” really does not live up to its billing. He critiques holism for its high
level of generality and lack of historical, contextual, and empirical detail
that the informed historian of religion might bring to the enterprise of
comparative religious ethics. Although Little’s teleological-Nibbanic driven
model overrides Reynolds’s more complex and nuanced interpretation
of dhamma, his critique of historians of religions’ holism for being
insufficiently historical is well taken and has served to advance the ongoing comparative religious ethics debates between ethicists and historians
of religion. Furthermore, in his work on Sri Lanka, Little moves beyond
his Nibbanic preoccupations to become more empirical, contextual, and
historical.
Theravada Buddhism and Sri Lanka
In his more recent work on Sri Lanka, one of the countries included in the
U.S. Institute of Peace Religion, Nationalism, and Intolerance project, Little
moves from the meta-ethical project represented by Comparative Religious
Ethics: A New Method, and his subsequent dhammic dialogue with history
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of religion “holism,” to a specific historical context in which Buddhism
has played a significant role in the discourse and practice of chauvinistic
Sinhala nationalism. In his Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity and related
essays, Weberian interests are also evident, but now woven into a more
historically and contextually complex tapestry.22 Reflecting Weber’s view
regarding the close entanglement of religion and ethnicity, Little challenges
assessments of the Sinhala-Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka that focus primarily
on nationalism, or privilege ethnicity to the near exclusion of religion. He
points out that ethnic groups elevate their status above their neighbors by
invoking a sacred warrant; hence, “religious shaded ethnic tensions appear
to be latent in the very process of ethnic classification.”23 In support of his
view, Little quotes the Sri Lankan historian, K. M. deSilva: “In the Sinhala
language, the words for nation, race and people are practically synonymous,
and a multiethnic or multicommunal nation or state is incomprehensible
to the popular mind. The emphasis on Sri Lanka as the land of the Sinhala
Buddhists carried an emotional popular appeal, compared with which the
concept of a multiethnic polity was a meaningless abstraction.”24
In the construction of the Buddhist warrant for an ideology of Sinhala
nationalism, Little points to the legitimating power of the authoritative
Sinhala Buddhist chronicle, the Mahavamsa, and its valorization of King
Duttagamaani’s defeat of the Tamils, the rise of Sinhala nationalistic
sentiment in response to British colonialism, and ever increasing anti-Tamil
attitudes and policies after the 1956 election of S. W. R. D. Bandaranike
culminating in the internecine armed conflict that began in 1983. Little
concludes, “[t]here can be little doubt that religious belief has, for several
reasons, functioned in an important way as a warrant for intolerance so far
as the Sinhala Buddhists are concerned. There is also evidence, though it
is more controversial and perhaps less pronounced, that the same is true
for Tamils.”25
Little sees religion as being one of the factors, along with ethnicity,
language, cultural habits, and historical dynamics contributing to one group
declaring superiority and preeminence over another. He notes that social
scientists tend to claim “that nationalist conflicts are either not about
ethnicity and religion at all, but rather about economic and political matters,
or that they are at bottom more about ethnic than religious issues.”26 In
the case of Sri Lanka, however, “it was the religious factor—the sacred
legends synthesized by Buddhist monks into the Mahavamsa and the other
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chronicles—that gave special authority to the Sinhala as a ‘chosen people’
and thereby entitled them . . . to preserve and protect the preeminence of
the Sinhala Buddhist tradition in Sri Lankan life.”27
In “Belief, Ethnicity, and Nationalism,” Little frames the Sri Lanka
case typologically in terms of two types of modern nationalism: liberal and
illiberal, civic versus ethnic, non-aggressive versus aggressive. Citing Weber’s
characterization of nationalism as, at bottom, both a homogenizing and a
differentiation mode of discourse that drives toward cultural standardization,
Sri Lanka exemplifies illiberal, ethnic, aggressive nationalism sanctified by
the Buddhist sangha (monastic order). Little is not claiming that Buddhist
belief, as such, legitimates a virulent, chauvinistic Sinhala nationalism.
Indeed, as he points out, the basic tenets and doctrines of Buddhism would
not seem to support ethnic favoritism. Such attitudes, rather, resulted from
a combination of historical pressures on the Theravada sangha in the fifth
and sixth centuries CE, and colonial and post-colonial experiences in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including attitudes of racism and
anti-Buddhist intolerance fostered by Christian missionaries and British
colonial authorities.
In conclusion I choose to highlight one of several issues that
Little’s engagement with Theravada Buddhist ethics raises within the
on-going debates in the field of comparative religious ethics, namely, the
relationship—might we say the dialectical relationship—between theory
and history broadly construed. Comparative Religious Ethics was criticized for
being overly theoretical and insufficiently historical. Stout, for example,
observed, “What would a more genuinely historical approach to religion
and morality look like? Probably rather like some of the work Little and
Twiss find lacking in rigor. What seems like insufficient dedication to rigor
on the part of historians may well be an altogether healthy willingness
to make contact with all the messy details of historical change.”28 Little
acknowledges that he would now approach Theravada ethics quite
differently than he did in Comparative Religious Ethics. Putting the shoe on the
other foot, he criticizes historians of religion for their generalized holism
which, he argues, is insufficiently historical. In contrast, Little’s work on
Buddhism and nationalism in Sri Lanka is quite attentive to historical detail
within the dual typology of liberal and illiberal nationalism: “We must be
as attentive to the conditioning effects of politics, economics, historical
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accidents and so on, on religion and culture, as we are to the contribution
of religion and culture to the formation of nationalism.”29
Finally, of the Weberian perspectives that inform the examples of
Little’s work I have cited in this brief chapter, a Nibbanized Theravada
that limits an ethic of other-regard, and a politicized Theravada that
warrants ethnic nationalism—it is the latter that engages the “complexity
and historical realities of the Theravada tradition” and in doing so might
be seen as Little’s answer to his critique of holism for not taking sufficient
account of changing social, political, and historical contexts.30
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